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Résumé Abstract
Malgré que la plupart des gens meurent à un âge avancé,
peu  d’attention  est  accordée  aux  cas  impliquant  des
personnes  âgées  dans  les  débats  sur  les  dimensions
morales et juridiques de la prise de décision de fin de vie.
Le but de cet article est de déterminer de quelle manière
nos  discussions  devraient  changer  à  mesure  que  nous
prêtons  attention  aux  facteurs  importants  influençant  les
décisions de fin de vie pour les personnes en âge avancé.
Mettant l’accent sur la prévalence des comorbidités ainsi
que la probabilité que les gens en âge avancé connaîtront
une longue période de déclin de leurs fonctions avant de
mourir,  je soutiens que nos débats devraient être élargis
pour inclure une plus grande considération à la façon dont
nous voulons vivre dans les phases finales de la vie. Avec
cela, je plaide contre la tendance à penser que la prise de
décisions de « fin de vie » ne concerne que la prise de
décisions concernant le moment et la façon dont il convient
de mettre fin à la vie d’une personne. Je soutiens, en outre,
que nous devrions sortir de la médicalisation de la mort.
Despite the fact that most people die in advanced old age,
little attention is given to cases involving older people in
debates about the moral and legal dimensions of end-of-life
decision making. The purpose of this paper is to establish
some of the ways our discussions should change as we
pay  attention  to  important  factors  influencing  end-of-life
decisions for people in advanced old age. Focusing on the
prevalence of comorbidities and the likelihood that people
in advanced old age will experience an extended period of
declining function before death,  I  argue that  our debates
should  be  expanded  to  include  greater  consideration  of
how we want to live in the final stages of life. With this, I am
arguing  against  the  tendency  to  think  that  “end-of-life”
decision  making  concerns  only  making  decisions  about
when and how it is appropriate to terminate a person’s life. I
argue,  further,  that  we  should  move  away  from  the
medicalization of dying.
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Introduction
Debates about end-of-life decision making tend to focus on cases involving people we know about
because of  the highly  public  circumstances surrounding their  deaths:  Karen Ann Quinlan,  Nancy
Cruzan, Tracy Latimer, Sue Rodriguez, and Terri Schiavo. The notoriety of these cases is due largely
to the fact that they are atypical. Each involves extraordinary circumstances including an elevated
legal-political profile [1].1 None of these landmark cases focuses on the conditions most of us will
experience as we approach the end of our lives. Most people die without much media attention and
fanfare. Most people do not die following an accident like Quinlan, Cruzan, or Schiavo, and most
people’s stories do not include the drama of a life ending in childhood like Latimer or at the age at
which most people are healthy, able-bodied, adults like Quinlan, Cruzan, Rodriquez, and Schiavo. 
Our fascination with famous cases distracts us from the reality that most people in North America die
in  old  age.  Demographic  trends  reflect  an  increasing  number  of  people  will  live  to,  and  die  in,
advanced old age – the ‘baby-boomers’ are now entering retirement and many in this generation are
likely  to  live beyond their  85th birthdays [2].  Despite  these facts,  little  attention  is  given to  cases
involving older people in either theoretical or practical discussions about end-of-life decision making.
This is a problem for the reason that some of the salient factors influencing the decisions we make at
the end of our lives tend to arise only when we are old. Thus, to the extent that we ignore cases
involving older people, we stand to overlook important factors related to end-of-life decision making. 
The purpose of this paper is to establish some of the ways in which our debates about end-of-life
decision  making  will  change  if  we  give  serious  consideration  to  the  many  and  complex  factors
influencing end-of-life decisions for people in advance old age, i.e. people who are more than 85
years old. I start by establishing that people in advanced old age are more likely than other people,
including other seniors over the age of 65, to experience comorbidities and an extended period of
declining function before they die. Focusing on these factors, I argue that our discussions about end-
of-life  decision making should be refocused in  two ways.  First,  we should pay more attention to
questions about the quality of the lives people are living, questions that are difficult to answer in any
context, but especially in the context of advanced old age. Second, we should resist the tendency
toward the medicalization of dying and the related tendency to think about end-of-life decision making
mostly in the medical context.
The Longer We Live…
Though most studies and published data classify any person who is over the age of 65 as elderly
without distinction,2 there are salient trends concerning the relation between the cause of death and
age among seniors. These trends confirm that the longer a person lives, the more likely it is that the
person will  die after a prolonged period of declining function rather than of an acute event like a
massive heart attack without any prior decline in health or of cancers that have a distinct terminal
phase [4-12]. Consider, for instance, the relation between age and the two leading causes of death in
North America: cancer and diseases of the heart (cancer in Canada, diseases of the heart in the
United States) [3].3 The likelihood of dying of cancer is highest in individuals who are 65-70 years old
1 I thank Stephen Katz for suggesting relevant literature to focus my thinking. He led me to consider the work by Sharon
Kaufman [1] that informs the argument in the second part of this paper. Kaufman argues that what she calls the “cultural
conversation” about end of life decisions emphasizes “discrete entities in opposition” that fail to capture the muddled nature
of actual cases [1, p. 716].
2 While I acknowledge that there are exceptions, in general, we see the lumping together of all people over the age of 65
even in reports that acknowledge both the need to consider the implications of an aging population on end-of-life decision
making and the heterogeneity of health status in people of advanced age. One obvious offender is  The Royal Society of
Canada Expert Panel: End-of-Life Decision Making [3]. Even in the section of this report focussing on aging, only the group
of seniors – i.e., the group of people over the age of 65 – is noted.
3 All statistical claims in this paper – even those for which specific statistics are not provided – are supported by the most
recent data made available by Statistics Canada and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
ISSN 1923-2799 2 / 10
B J Stoyles BioéthiqueOnline 2014, 3/6
(http://bioethiqueonline.ca/3/6)
and it decreases as age increases afterwards. Conversely, the likelihood of dying of chronic diseases
of the heart increases with age.
Among individuals aged 65-74, cancer is the leading cause of death in both Canada and the U.S.
(45.2% in Canada and 35.2% in the U.S.). The percentage of deaths caused by cancer decreases in
individuals aged 75 to 84; in this age group it is the cause of death in less than one third of cases
(31.7% in Canada and 25.1% in the U.S.). For the group of individuals who are 85 and older, the
percentage drops by half again (to 15.7% in Canada and 12.4% in the U.S.).4 
Diseases of the heart are, taken together, the leading cause of death for people over the age of 85
(25.8% in Canada and 30.7% in the U.S.). Other chronic diseases that cause very few deaths in
younger people also become increasingly prevalent in the group of people who are 85 years and
older. Alzheimer’s disease, for example, is the cause of death for approximately one percent of people
who die between the ages of 65 and 74 whereas this increases to five percent or higher (5% in
Canada and 7% in U.S.) in individuals reaching more advanced old age.
Comorbidity is also more prevalent in advanced old age [11,14].  It  is estimated, for instance, that
people in advanced old age are likely to have three or four chronic morbidities [15] and that 80% to
90%  of  elderly  patients  with  infections  also  have  other  diseases  including  cancer,  diabetes,
Alzheimer’s disease, chronic congestive heart failure and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [16].
These conditions can be mutually exacerbating.
Given the fact that people in advanced old age become increasingly likely to die at the end of some
chronic illness,  along with  the prevalence of  comorbidity,  it  is  easy to understand Joanne Lynn’s
observation that, though “‘The Dying’ are expected to do little but wrap up life and go…this dominant
myth about dying does not fit many people. Many elderly people are inching toward oblivion with small
losses every few weeks or months” [4, p. S14] in a way that makes sense of Jill Lepore’s claim that
“[t]he longer we live, the longer we die” [17, p. 159].5
Identifying just when a person has reached the stage that death would be a welcome alternative to
continued living is a considerable challenge when the person’s physical and mental health decline
slowly and without any distinct terminal phase. Many of the cases upon which our public debates are
focused involve people in permanent vegetative states and people facing predictably rapid trajectories
of declining function owing to diseases such as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS or Lou Gehrig’s
Disease).6
In her highly publicized case in 1993, for example, Sue Rodriguez fought for (but was not granted) the
legal right to assisted suicide after being diagnosed with ALS [19]. In 2012, another woman diagnosed
with ALS, Gloria Taylor, was granted the right to assisted suicide by the Supreme Court of British
Columbia [20]. (Though Taylor is now dead, the decision in her case has been appealed and will be
considered by the Supreme Court of Canada.) Rodriguez, Taylor and others who fight for the right to
assisted death share the assumption that there will be a time at which continued life would be bad for
them. Because of the predictably rapid decline in function that results from ALS, people diagnosed
with this disease are usually able to identify a specific stage in the process of decline after which they
predict they will no longer want to be alive. Typically, this is the stage at which they are suffering too
much to live even minimally well. (There is, of course, disagreement about how much a person should
be willing or forced to suffer and what constitutes too much suffering.) 
4 It is unfortunate that much of the scientific work done to help us better understand death and dying focuses on patients
dying of cancer as these patients’ experiences differ from the experiences of most people in advanced old age [13].
5 For the same language, see also [18].
6 Of the cases listed at the start of this article, Tracy Latimer’s is the exception. Latimer was diagnosed with Cerebral Palsy
and suffered both regular seizures and apparently constant pain until her father ended her life in 1993.
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In contrast, and because they are inching toward oblivion, determining when people in advanced old
age reach the stage at which their quality of life is so low that continued life is no longer desirable can
be a real challenge. A person with Alzheimer’s, for instance, is likely to suffer the most emotional
stress in the early stages of this disease in so far as the person is still aware of, and frustrated by, her
failing memory. As this disease progresses, the person is likely to experience a very long period of
declining function. It is not clear at what point along this slow slide we might reasonably decide the
person’s life is no longer worth fighting to preserve. Even this, however, is easier than determining
when all of the creaks and groans associated with growing old are simply too much to bear. Consider
the following snippets from Roger Angell’s account of life in his nineties: 
Check me out. The top two knuckles of my left hand look as if I’d been worked over by
the K.G.B. … if I pointed that hand at you like a pistol and fired at your nose, the bullet
would nail you in the left knee. Arthritis… I’m ninety-three, and I’m feeling great. Well,
pretty great, unless I’ve forgotten to take a couple of Tylenols in the past four or five
hours, in which case I’ve begun to feel some jagged little pains shooting down my left
forearm and into the base of the thumb…
Like many men and women my age, I get around with a couple of arterial stents that
keep my heart  chunking.  I  also sport  a  minute plastic  seashell  that  clamps shut  a
congenital hole in my heart, discovered in my early eighties… The lower-middle sector
of my spine twists and jogs like a Connecticut county road. This has cost me two or
three inches of height, transforming me from Gary Cooper to Geppetto…
I’ve endured a few knocks but missed worse. I know how lucky I am, and secretly tap
wood, greet the day, and grab a sneaky pleasure from my survival at long odds. The
pains and insults are bearable… [21]
For now, the pains are bearable. The question, though, is when will they be too much? Perhaps when
something  significant  goes wrong,  but  more  likely  after  inching  along  in  successively  tiny  steps.
Perhaps the fact that we inch along in this way will actually mean we never consider the pains and
insults unbearable. As Angell goes on to note, “[r]ecent and not so recent surveys (including the six-
decades-long Grant Study of the lives of some nineteen-forties Harvard graduates) confirm that a
majority of us people over seventy-five keep surprising ourselves with happiness. Put me on that
list” [21].
How we live matters
The manner in which Angell focuses on how older people are surprised by their continued happiness
highlights that the important question does not concern how we die, but rather how we live. It is odd,
then, that debates about the moral and legal dimensions of end-of-life decision making – debates
intended to shape public opinion and policy – are really only debates about the permissibility of ending
life [22]. The hyphenated term “end-of-life” has taken on a pseudo-technical meaning related to the
termination of life in so far as the literature on end-of-life decision making focuses, almost exclusively,
on the question of whether we should be allowed to determine when and how a person dies. The
Royal Society of Canada’s Expert Panel report on end-of-life decision making, for example, is focused
on euthanasia and assisted suicide [3]. Empirical studies tend to focus on individual factors (such as
the effective use of Do Not Resuscitate, or DNR, orders) that influence our decisions to continue or to
discontinue life-sustaining treatment options. Even more comprehensive studies such as SUPPORT
(the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for  Outcomes and Risks of  Treatment – a
multimillion dollar and multi-site study of the process of dying in American hospitals) are focused on
decisions related to dying.
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One consequence of the manner in which our debates about end-of-life decision making are focused
is that end-of-life discussions are often put off until a person is nearly dead. For example, discussions
about advanced directives and DNRs frequently take place very late in the trajectory of illness [23],
often within days of a person’s death or discharge from a healthcare facility [24,25]. This is typically
also the stage at which people enter palliative care. It is as though we believe that a person is not
really dying until “he’s… taking to bed, losing weight, and suffering from pain…when dying is all that
he can do” [4,  p.  S14]. If  we leave our end-of-life  decision making until  this  point,  however, any
decisions we make will come well after the point at which they are relevant – well after palliative or
hospice care could offer benefits to the elderly person, and perhaps even after the person would
prefer to avoid aggressive treatment. At this point, we are too late to help the person in ways we could
have been helping them all along. 
The problem with the narrow focus of our debates is that we move away from the reason we are
having these debates in the first place. We only consider whether or not euthanasia and assisted
suicide should be allowed because we believe that some people’s lives are no longer worth living or,
worse, so full of pain that continued living would amount to too much suffering. The least controversial
cases are those in  which a person,  such as Donald Low, is suffering as a result  of  an incurable
condition  that  follows  a  predictable  path  of  rapidly  declining  physical  and  mental  function
accompanied by intense pain and ending in death.7 
It may be that “very little of the literature is based on the question of the worth of a life…because we
have no calculus by which it can be defined.”8 Yet, without considering the quality of life a person is
living,  the  factors  that  play  into  our  current,  narrowly  defined,  debates  are  empty.  Consider,  for
example,  that  there  would  be  little  sense  in  considering  the  likelihood  that  a  specific  course  of
treatment  would,  if  pursued,  keep  one  alive  longer  if  continued  life  would  constitute  continued
suffering.
Empirical evidence reflects that people in the final stages of life rank treatment options in relation to
the likelihood that  these treatment  options  will  allow them to continue living  with  the capacity  to
maintain what is valuable in their lives. This is reflected in the judgments made by people like Sue
Rodriguez and Gloria Taylor. As reported above, Rodriguez and Taylor fought for the right to die after
predicting that ALS would reduce their ability to function to the extent that they would no longer be
able to do any of the things that give their lives meaning.9 Similarly, and looking forward to old age, we
might be tempted to embrace the The Who’s infamous mantra “I hope to die before I get old” for the
reason that we cannot imagine what will give our lives meaning when we start to experience declining
health and function. 
Here again, however, there is evidence that the decision making process is different for people in
advanced old age than for younger people. Older people tend to think treatments are “desirable to the
extent they could return the patient to his or her valued life activities” [26, p. 620]. People’s decisions
concerning whether or not they should pursue treatment options, including those that could prolong
their lives, tend to hinge on the level of functionality they believe will be restored by the treatments
being offered [27-29]. Many people in advanced old age opt for treatment whenever there is a good
chance  the  treatment  will  restore  their  health  to  the  same  or  better  condition  than  they  were
experiencing  before  their  condition  necessitated  intervention.  And,  most  people  would  sacrifice
quantity to preserve quality of life [27,28,30-33].
7 Donald Low was a microbiologist who became a recognized public figure during the SARS outbreak in 2003. Days before
he died as a result of a brain tumour, Low produced a video making an informed and passionate plea for assisted suicide to
be made legal in Canada. This video was published after his death.
8 This was suggested by Tom Koch in a helpfully critical review of an earlier version of this paper.
9 In this regard, the famous cosmologist Stephen Hawking is remarkable since he has both lived longer than most people
with ALS and continues to live a life he thinks is a good life. In Hawking’s case, it has proven possible to continue with the
relationships and intellectual projects that give his life meaning. 
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As Angell reports, most people find themselves happy to continue living well beyond what they think of
as the prime of life. In contrast to people diagnosed with ALS who have too little time to adjust to their
rapid decline in function, people in advanced old age often experience declining function in such small
increments that their valued life activities can change accordingly. Opting for treatment that would
restore their health to the condition they were experiencing before the need for intervention amounts
to opting to restore the functionality that allows for them resume their valued life activities.
While I would never deny that it is important to determine the moral and legal status of euthanasia and
assisted suicide, I contend that we should expand the scope of what counts as an end-of-life decision
to encompass decisions we make about the end of life in the broader sense of the final period of a
person’s life. In this broader sense and in the context of debates about end-of-life decision making,
the end of a person’s life should be taken to include any period of declined or declining physical and
mental well-being before the person dies. For most of us who will live to advanced old age, this period
can  last  decades as  we  experience  comorbidities  and  the slow decline  of  function.  And,  in  this
context, there is an obvious sense in which deciding how we live in the final period of life is more
important than the precise manner of how we die. To see this, consider the joke in which a teacher
asks her students to introduce themselves on the first day of school by saying their names and then
saying what their moms or dads do. When it is Luke’s turn, he says, “My name is Luke and my dad is
dead.” After acknowledging the tragedy of the situation, the teacher asks Luke what his dad did before
he died. In response, Luke grabs his throat and yells “N’gungghhh!”10 Perhaps the best way to put my
point is that end-of-life decision making should not be restricted to the “N’gungghhh!” What comes
before that is more important. Rather than focusing exclusively on the “end-of-life” understood in the
narrow sense of the termination of life, our debates should take into account also how we live at the
end of life – not in the minutes, hours, or days before we die, but in the months and years that
constitute the last part of our lives.
I expect my argument for a shift in focus from the end of life to the end of  life will seem somewhat
banal  to  people  working in  the multidisciplinary  field  of  gerontology.11 These are  people who are
already studying how people live as they age. Moreover, palliative and hospice care specialists are
already focused on helping people manage symptoms so they can live well.12 So far, however, the
work of gerontologists and palliative care specialists has done little to expand the focus of our debates
about end-of-life decision making. In part, this might be for the reason that our debates tend to be
contextualized in relation to medical decision making.
The Medicalization of Dying
Most people in North America die following a decision to withdraw or withhold treatment in healthcare
institutions [36],  despite the fact that most of us would likely choose to die elsewhere should the
opportunity arise [37-46]. These facts reflect that dying has become a condition to be managed by
medicine [1,47]. There is an odd tension that arises from this arrangement. Healthcare providers, who
tend to see death as the enemy and allowing death as failure, are asked to administer care to help
individuals die well.  Despite the tension, palliative care centres and hospices are now established
10 This joke is an adaptation of the one presented by Angell [21].
11 Indeed, Tom Koch, for one, has written more than one op-ed piece in which he pushes for discussions about the end-of-life
to focus on compassion and care for old people [22,34]. Whereas Koch argues that we should be focusing on providing
support for fragile people, my focus is on living well more generally.
12 Unfortunately, palliative and hospice care realize an ‘oncology model’. The care provided in palliative contexts typically is
focused on managing the sort of symptoms experienced by patients with terminal cancer. These are patients who are often
experiencing significant pain and anxiety. And, these are patients whose disease is likely to bring about death in a short
timeframe once they enter into the terminal phase of their disease. Thus, palliative and hospice care is built on a model that
does not apply to most people over the age of 85 [2]. That many palliative care groups are cancer-focused was cited as a
limitation in reports concerning the use of palliative care for patients with heart failure and older patients [11,35]. 
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contexts in which healthcare providers focus on managing symptoms rather than fighting underlying,
morbid, conditions.
One consequence of  the medicalization of  dying is  that  end-of-life  decisions become forced. Not
choosing is not an option that is allowed in the clinical setting – even doing nothing becomes an
option that must be chosen. There is a presumed  imperative of choice,  an imperative that, in the
medical  setting,  someone  must engage  in  the  deliberative  process  that  leads  to  a  directive  for
treatment [1,47,48]. Despite this “dark side of patient autonomy” [48,  p. 231],13 we now have many
treatment options from which to choose.
Advances in medical research and technologies are making possible procedures that were recently
impossible.  With  these  advances  come  new  ethical  questions  related  to  the  end-of-life  –  new
questions arising from our increasing ability to orchestrate the timing and manner of a person’s death
[48-51]. For all practical concern, these were not questions demanding answers even 40 or 50 years
ago when we lacked effective means to sustain life. (I suspect these facts explain why debates about
end-of-life decision making arise mostly in the medical context.)
As research and technologies advance,  the availability of  treatments and procedures increases.14
Many courses of treatment that were novel in the recent past have become routine as a result. Heart
transplants, for example, were rare and usually fatal in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. The
success rates have since increased to the point that TIME magazine reported in 2009 that newest
challenge concerning heart transplants is surplus demand [52]. Other surgical procedures that were
once  high  risk  and  considered  inappropriate  for  people  in  advanced  old  age  are  now  routinely
performed on elderly patients. And, as these treatments become routine, attitudes towards their use
are adjusted and choice falls out of the equation [47]. Resources are typically put to use whenever,
and to the extent that, they are available [53] and choice gives way to the “technological imperative”:
we  ought  to  do  something  whenever  something  is  possible  [54].  So  strong  is  the  bias  toward
intervention when intervention is possible that the technological imperative has become perceived as
a moral imperative [47]. There is a moral pressure against denying a person any treatment that might
keep the person alive.
Paradoxically, in the same context we find the presumed imperative of choice, choice is replaced by
routine in so far as some courses of treatment have become so much a part of standard care that the
possibility of withholding treatment is often not even considered. The use of antibiotics, for example, is
now so routine that consent is not sought before treatment is started in most cases [16]. Antibiotics
can make the difference between living and dying. And, though we should be wary of William Osler’s
suggestion that “pneumonia may well be called the friend of the aged” [55], it is worth considering that
dying of pneumonia or infection might not be so bad given the alternatives in some cases.
The  bias  toward  intervention  within  hospital  settings  is  reflected  in  the  observation  that,  “while
hospitals were once feared as ‘places to die’ because so little could be done to avert death, some
people now fear hospitals as places to die because so  much  can be done.” [16,  p. 10] There is a
sense in which too much ‘care’ – meaning: too much intervention – can serve to detract from a dying
patient’s well-being [53].
Conclusions 
Taking seriously the idea that debates about end-of-life decision making are really debates about the
decisions we want to be able to make, we need to avoid the medicalization of dying in so far as it
moves  us  into  a  context  in  which  decision  making  is  either  absent  (as  we  blindly  follow  the
13 Loewy [49] argues that forcing someone to make a decision they do not want to make is a form of paternalism.
14 This is a consequence of decreasing costs, increasing success rates, the availability of caregivers trained to administer the
treatments, the availability of equipment, the possibility of reimbursement, etc.
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technological imperative) or forced (because refusing or withdrawing treatment becomes a choice that
has to be articulated and, often, fought for). And, in any case, who wants to live in a medical context?
Here we should remember the lesson from Aristotle that medicine is for the sake of health and health
is for the sake of living well.
If  one accepts my call  to move the focus of  our debates about  end-of-life  decision making from
debates about when and how life will end to discussions about the best way to live at the end of our
lives, then more work is needed to generate space in our debates for discussions about cases that
better reflect the context in which people in advanced old age make end-of-life decisions. This is, after
all,  the context in which most of us will  find ourselves at the end of our lives – a context that is
different, in salient ways, from the context of those highly public cases that tend to be the focus of our
discussions. Since most people will not die like Cruzan, Schiavo or Latimer, it is important that we also
focus on normal cases.
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